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Equality and Information
AbstrAct. Traditional outcome-orientated egalitarian principles require access 
to information about the size of individual holdings. Recent egalitarian political 
theory has sought to accommodate considerations of responsibility. Such a 
move may seem problematic, in that a new informational burden is thereby 
introduced, with no apparent decrease in the existing burden. This article uses 
a simple model with simulated data to examine the extent to which outcome 
egalitarianism and responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism (‘luck egalitarianism’) 
can be accurately applied where information is incomplete or erroneous. It is 
found that, while outcome egalitarianism tends to be more accurately applied, 
its advantage is not overwhelming, and in many prima facie plausible circum-
stances luck egalitarianism would be more accurately applied. This suggests that 
luck egalitarianism cannot be rejected as utopian. Furthermore, while some 
argue that, in practice, luck egalitarianism is best realized indirectly, by securing 
equality of outcome, our evidence suggests that a luck egalitarian rule of regula-
tion offers a far more accurate implementation of the luck egalitarian ideal than 
does an outcome egalitarian rule of regulation.
Keywords: Distributive justice, egalitarianism, feasibility, luck, outcome, respon-
sibility
I. IntroductIon
One of the most prominent developments in recent normative polit-ical theory has been the rise of responsibility. Writers such as 
Richard Arneson (1989), G. A. Cohen (1989) and John Roemer (1993; 
1998) have argued that inequalities are only objectionable where persons 
are not responsible for them. Even equalities require justification: where 
responsibility is relevantly unequal, distributions must also be unequal. 
This responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism or luck egalitarianism seeks to 
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equalize or neutralize the effects of luck, understood as the inverse of 
responsibility (Hurley 2003). 
Many political theorists have argued against this kind of position on 
normative grounds, and some have even appealed to metaphysical con-
cerns.1 But feasibility issues – those concerning the extent to which luck 
egalitarianism may actually be realizable – have received less attention. 
Where these issues are mentioned at all, it is often said to be extremely 
hard, or even impossible, to bring about a recognizably luck egalitarian 
distribution. Many maintain that we should either forget about luck egal-
itarianism altogether, or forget about it in practice, focusing instead on 
achieving its objectives indirectly – by equalizing outcomes, for instance. 
Such reactions are not really surprising, for the reference to responsibility 
makes informational demands that are not made by traditional outcome-
orientated egalitarian principles. Furthermore, the informational demands 
that are made by such principles, including those concerning the size of 
individual holdings, are retained by luck egalitarianism. It may appear that 
existing problems are greatly amplified.
This contribution examines the feasibility of luck egalitarianism in 
circumstances of incomplete or erroneous information. Any other obsta-
cles there may be to realizing the favoured distribution are set aside. To 
be sure, a government may not be able to deliver the appropriate resources 
and opportunities to the appropriate persons even when they have full 
information. But there is no obvious reason for thinking that this would 
be any more of a problem for luck egalitarianism than it would be for any 
distributive theory or principle that may require substantial redistribution. 
Economists have, of course, been interested in problems presented 
by imperfect information scenarios for some time, the ‘optimal income 
tax problem’ being a classic example of this (Mirrlees 1971). The problem 
of interest here differs from this, and from mechanism design problems 
in general, in being concerned principally with the feasibility of two dis-
tributive principles under given informational conditions, and leaving aside the 
effects of different policies on agents’ willingness to reveal information. 
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Since we are concerned with this much simpler but (in this context) 
relatively neglected problem, we can focus on a basic model designed for 
this purpose, and leave aside the far more sophisticated models created 
for more complex problems.
Luck egalitarianism will be taken as a generic distributive principle, 
without specifying what it is that it actually distributes. It will, in section 
III onwards, be compared to its most obvious rival – a similarly generic 
form of outcome egalitarianism. In both cases it may be supposed that 
the thing being distributed is likely to be some form of welfare, resources, 
or capabilities (or a hybrid), but none of the argument would be under-
mined were the luck egalitarian concerned to distribute something else.
Our luck egalitarianism is in fact so generic that it need not really be 
luck egalitarianism at all. It could be replaced by many other forms of 
egalitarianism that rely upon information about holdings and one other 
personal characteristic that is considered relevant to redistribution by that 
theory or principle.2 It is appropriate to focus on responsibility as it is a 
particularly significant characteristic, which is embodied in familiar 
accounts of justice. Evidently, nothing is presumed about what responsi-
bility is, or how often it is present.
In another way, however, a certain conception of egalitarianism will 
be assumed. Specifically, the principle will be described as seeking to give 
each person the percentage of their current holding to which they are 
entitled. Where the relevant characteristic is responsibility, the objective 
is to give each person the percentage of their current holding for which 
they are deemed to be responsible. If they are responsible for more than 
they hold – that is, if they have thus far been unfairly denied that to which 
they are entitled – the percentage will be greater than one hundred. This 
is how luck egalitarianism is often conceived, and some other conceptions 
of it – for instance, the idea that persons receive a share of society’s ben-
efits that is proportionate to their individual responsibilities – may be 
more or less reducible to it. But there may be other conceptualizations of 
luck egalitarianism for which the approach of this paper is less applicable.
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Other assumptions will be mentioned in due course. First, however, 
we must look at the kind of information-related objections to luck 
egalitarianism that may be raised. This will reveal two distinct kinds of 
reasons for thinking that our central question of the direct practicality of 
accounts of distributive justice – that is, their usefulness in designing 
policy to further their own ends – matters.
II. InformAtIonAl objectIons to lucK egAlItArIAnIsm
The informational limitations that face luck egalitarianism have resulted in 
its proponents adopting rough-and-ready distributive strategies. This 
approach has come in for criticism. On reporting Arneson’s (1989: 87) 
position that we should concentrate our efforts towards a luck egalitarian 
ideal even if it is not fully realizable, Marc Fleurbaey offers this commentary:
But this approximation method makes sense only if there is some con-
tinuity in the process, that ensures that any refinement of our knowl-
edge of the outcome function and its arguments can lead the actual 
allocation of resources closer to equal opportunity. However, nothing 
is less plausible. The structure of the equal opportunity principle is 
such that, whenever there is some imperfection in the information 
about the outcome function or the observed variables, the allocation 
chosen to implement a gross equal opportunity can be quite far from 
the ideal allocation (1995, 43).
Fleurbaey glosses his criticism by noting that the discoveries of childhood 
events and genetic predispositions may increase and decrease a disadvan-
taged individual’s compensation at various points of his or her life. This 
is correct, but the nature of his objection is not immediately clear. It will 
be illuminating to go through some possible interpretations.3
One objection suggested by Fleurbaey’s comments on approximation 
is that, while errors in information and outcomes are continuous under 
some distributive principles, in the sense that small errors in information 
lead to small variations from the objective, those under luck egalitarianism 
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are discontinuous, with small errors in information leading to large varia-
tions from the objective. This is distinct from, though related to, the 
objection that, while some principles are monotonic, meaning that better 
information brings distributions closer to the target, luck egalitarianism is 
not, as better information may result in a greater divergence between 
objective and outcome.4
The continuity and monotonicity objections are both distinct from, 
but related to, a final objection that, though not too apparent in the pre-
vious quote from Fleurbaey, is more explicit elsewhere. It is, Fleurbaey 
holds, “unlikely that the result of a political selection of the factors for 
which individuals are held responsible would be even an approximate 
implementation” of luck egalitarianism (1995, 39). He even goes so far as 
to say that the position is “completely untractable [sic]” and its implemen-
tation “impossible” (1995, 43; 42). The claim seems to be that luck egal-
itarianism has poor application accuracy. Those attempting to apply luck 
egalitarianism end up with distributions that are far away from their ideal. 
Now this is true of many principles, at least where information is scarce. 
Thus the best construal of the accuracy objection is comparative: it is 
acknowledged that many principles experience application problems 
where relevant information is unavailable, but it is claimed that this prob-
lem is particularly severe for luck egalitarianism on account of its use of 
responsibility information.5 We can say that the accuracy objection is 
related to the continuity and monotonicity objections as luck egalitarian-
ism’s (supposed) inaccuracy, relative to other principle, may be caused by 
its (supposed) discontinuity and non-monotonicity.
Each of the above informational objections to luck egalitarianism 
comes in two varieties, each of which corresponds to a reason for think-
ing that the direct practicality of an account of justice matters. The first, 
which appears to be broadly favoured by Fleurbaey, might be called 
practical-fundamental. Here the idea is that we ought to reject luck egali-
tarianism as a political position on account of its unfeasibility. It is sup-
ported by the view that direct practicality matters because it is a necessary 
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condition for a worthwhile account of justice. Although, intuitively, an account 
of justice should not be disregarded on the ground that it is hard to real-
ize its goals in practice, in extreme cases this might be the case. Consider, 
for instance, an account of justice that states that holdings must be per-
fectly equalized, and that the smallest divergence from this ideal is as 
great a wrong as the largest. Such a position requires, among other 
things, complete, flawless knowledge of every person’s holdings, down 
to the last penny and slightest trinket. This position might sensibly be 
thought to be utopian in the pejorative sense of being so far removed 
from that which is realizable as to be an irrelevance (see Nagel 1991). 
The same might be true of luck egalitarianism, if it is the case that its 
informational demands are such that any attempt to apply it in foresee-
able circumstances will no more yield luck egalitarian outcomes than 
random distributive decisions would. If luck egalitarian policy is utter 
guesswork, but outcome egalitarianism can be applied with some accu-
racy, that may provide a prima facie reason for egalitarians to favour the 
latter over the former. Even though it is not strictly speaking a moral 
reason, it may appear decisive.
Practical-fundamental objections may seem at odds with some recent 
arguments of Cohen’s. It may be fruitful to briefly consider his influential 
resistance to the idea, which he associates with John Rawls (1999), that 
justice is constrained by practicality:
Facts about agent incapacity are (usually) the end of the matter with 
respect to rules of regulation, but not with respect to ultimate princi-
ples. It’s futile to adopt a rule that no one can follow, but to say that 
it’s futile to subscribe to a certain fundamental principle is a category 
mistake: unlike instituting a rule, subscribing to a principle is not an 
action but the having of a belief or attitude, and, not being an action, 
such subscribing cannot be futile (though it can, of course, be mis-
guided) [… F]acts about capacity do not disqualify the principles that 
are here in dispute, that is, fundamental ones. They disqualify, at most, 
rules of regulation (Cohen 2008, 253-254).
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Cohen’s position is that barriers, including informational barriers, to 
agents’ ability to effectively act on principles are no objection where those 
principles are fundamental: if this is correct, it would follow that the 
fundamental principles of luck egalitarianism cannot be challenged on 
informational grounds, as the practical-fundamental objections claim.
We do not here intend to take issue with the above position, to which 
we are sympathetic. Regardless of whether Cohen’s position is true, one 
form of practical-fundamental objection may still have force. David Miller 
is not making an outlandish claim when he writes that “political philoso-
phy is a branch of practical reason – it is thought whose final aim is to 
guide action, as opposed to having a merely speculative purpose” (2008, 
44). Many – probably most – political philosophers would agree. Even if 
they were convinced that fundamental principles could not be shown to 
be mistaken or futile on practicality grounds, their level of interest in luck 
egalitarianism would drop close to zero if it was shown that it could not 
guide action – not even in the sense of providing a pro tanto reason for 
particular actions. We can distinguish stronger and weaker versions of the 
practical-fundamental objection: the strong version says that luck egali-
tarianism’s (alleged) impracticality shows it to not to be worthwhile in the 
sense of being mistaken or futile; the weak version says that luck egali-
tarianism’s (alleged) impracticality shows it to not be worthwhile in the 
sense of being speculative rather than (pro tanto) action guiding.
The second variety of informational objection is purely practical. In this 
case objectors make no grand claim about the political acceptability of luck 
egalitarianism or its interest to political philosophers. Rather, they maintain 
that, whatever luck egalitarianism’s moral and political credentials, it is an 
error to use it directly in practice. It is instead best realized indirectly – that 
is, through the pursuit of some non-luck egalitarian principle. This objec-
tion is supported by the view that the direct practicality of an account of 
justice matters because it is a key consideration in designing policy to achieve that 
account’s objectives. It is sometimes suggested, for instance, that such is the 
difficultly in distinguishing that which people are responsible for from that 
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which they are not, luck egalitarians should in practice all but forget about 
responsibility-justified inequalities, and instead pursue outcome equalities 
(Barry 2006, 97-98; Barry 2008, 146-148; see also Fox-Genovese 1995; 
Miller 1997, 229). The objection is not to luck egalitarianism per se, but to 
self-defeating ‘over-applications’ of luck egalitarian policy. Its positive 
implication is that policy may be best aimed at achieving equality of out-
come, even if we endorse luck egalitarianism at the level of principle.
The obvious reply to the purely practical objection is that luck egalitar-
ians do not typically intend their principles to be applied directly. Hence, 
even if the best way of achieving luck egalitarian goals was by using an 
applied version of outcome egalitarianism or some other rule of regulation, 
which would not be contrary to any of the central luck egalitarian claims. 
The reply is sound, but the purely practical objection remains interesting. 
This is because its success or failure will offer some guidance on how luck 
egalitarianism may best be applied. That is of note in its own right, since 
luck egalitarians typically intend their principles to have some practical bite, 
even if (as the above obvious reply suggests) this is only at the level of 
choosing between rules of regulation. And it may also bear in an indirect 
way on discussions about the moral credentials of luck egalitarianism. For 
instance, some critics of luck egalitarianism appear to assume that it would 
be applied in very direct fashion, amounting to an extension of existing 
conditional forms of welfare provision, with inevitably inegalitarian results 
(Wolff 1998; Anderson 1999). But if luck egalitarianism actually mandates 
an outcome egalitarian rule of regulation, this line of objection seems mis-
directed. This example underscores the point that the most plausible form 
of the purely practical objection is not an objection to luck egalitarianism, 
but rather to the most direct way of applying it.
The next section addresses the practical-fundamental objection, and 
specifically, the objection of this sort that appeals to accuracy. In section 
IV the versions of the practical-fundamental objection that rely on con-
tinuity and monotonicity are examined. The purely practical version of 
the accuracy objection is tackled in section V.
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III. AccurAcy
Suppose that Smith holds 20 units of advantage (U). S/he is responsible 
for 10 of those units, the remainder being attributed to, say, a high native 
talent that s/he has not fully utilized. Were resources equalized between 
Smith and every other member of society, each individual would hold 
10U. In one scenario, informational limitations result in the Ministry of 
Distributive Justice overestimating Smith’s advantage by 10%, and underesti-
mating the contribution to his/her advantage for which s/he may be held 
responsible by 10% of that holding (i.e. his/her responsible contribution 
is estimated at 40%). The Ministry’s two ministers agree that the evidence 
suggests that Smith holds 22U, and that this is too much, but disagree 
about how much should be taken away from him/her, and why it should 
be taken away. One minister, a luck egalitarian, states that Smith is 
entitled to 8.8U (40% of 22U, i.e. the underestimated responsible share 
of the overestimated holding), and therefore proposes to strip him/her 
of 13.2U, actually leaving him/her with 6.8U. The other minister, an out-
come egalitarian, maintains that Smith is entitled to 10U, and therefore 
proposes to strip him/her of 12U, actually leaving him/her with 8U (since 
s/he really only held 20U, rather than 22U). With these informational 
imperfections there is less accuracy where luck egalitarianism is applied 
as it has left Smith 32% short of his/her luck egalitarian entitlement, 
whereas outcome egalitarianism left him/her 20% short of his/her out-
come egalitarian entitlement.
However, this result is not recorded in all cases of informational 
imperfection. Suppose the Ministry overestimates by 10% both Smith’s advan-
tage and the contribution to it for which s/he may be held responsible. 
Here the luck egalitarian again believes Smith holds 22U, but that s/he is 
entitled to 13.2U (the now overestimated responsible share [60%] of the 
still overestimated holding). S/he will therefore decrease Smith’s holding 
by 8.8U, actually leaving him/her with 11.2U – 12% more than s/he 
actually ought to be given on a luck egalitarian scheme. The outcome 
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egalitarian also believes that Smith holds 22U. As s/he holds that Smith is 
entitled to 10U, s/he would reduce his/her holding by 12U, actually leav-
ing him/her with 8U – some 20% less than that specified by the outcome 
egalitarian ideal. In this case the outcome egalitarian inaccuracy is consid-
erably more pronounced than the luck egalitarian inaccuracy.
Of course, the fact that there are some cases in which luck egalitarian-
ism can be more accurately applied than outcome egalitarianism is hardly 
sufficient to address the practical-fundamental version of the accuracy 
objection. It might be thought that such cases are few and far between. 
But they are in fact rather common.
Let a be defined as the actual size of the individual’s holding prior to 
redistribution, in terms of units of advantage (or U). g is defined as the 
error in estimating the size of the holding as a fraction of the holding. e is 
defined as the total holdings of U in society divided by the total number 
of persons (i.e. an equal share). b is defined as the actual responsibility as 
a fraction of the holding. d is defined as the error in estimating responsibil-
ity as a fraction of the holding. a, b, and e must be non-negative values, 
since it is impossible for a person to hold a negative amount of U, impos-
sible for a person to be responsible for less than 0% of their holding, and 
impossible for society to hold a negative amount of U (or a negative 
amount of persons). The values of g and d can be positive, negative, or 
zero; a positive value denotes an information overestimate, a negative 
value denotes an underestimate, while zero indicates a correct estimate.
For simplicity, it may be assumed that the population is large enough 
for the effects of errors in information about an individual’s holdings on 
decision makers’ perceptions of the equal share to be negligible. For this 
reason g and e are independent variables. It is also assumed that decision 
makers have good information about the population size and total level 
of advantage but worse information about individual cases. This is there-
fore no variable for the error in estimating e.
The formula for the percentage divergence of outcome egalitarianism 
from its ideal under informational constraints can be derived as follows. 
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Smith holds a units. The Ministry of Distributive Justice assume Smith’s 
holding to be a (1 + g) units, where g is the error in estimating the size 
of the holding as a fraction of that holding. The outcome egalitarian 
minister in the Ministry of Justice considers Smith, like all members of 
society, to be entitled to e units. S/he therefore proposes to strip Smith 
of a (1 + g) – e units, leaving Smith with a – a (1 + g) + e = e – a g units. 
In fact, Smith and all members of society should, according to outcome 
egalitarianism, each hold e units, thus the estimation errors have resulted 
in Smith retaining e – a g – e = – a g units too many (or being stripped 
of too many if this number is negative). So as a percentage of the units 
to which Smith is actually entitled under outcome egalitarianism this is
-100a g
e
The formula for the percentage divergence of luck egalitarianism from its 
ideal under informational constraints can be derived as follows. Smith again 
holds a units. Smith is responsible for a b units, where b is the fraction of 
the holding for which Smith is responsible. The Department of Justice 
again assume Smith’s holding to be a (1 + g) units, where g is the error in 
estimating the size of the holding as a fraction of that holding. The Depart-
ment of Justice assume Smith to be responsible for a fraction b + d of his/
her holding, where d is the error in estimating responsibility as a fraction 
of the holding. The Department of Justice’s luck egalitarian minister 
assumes Smith to be responsible for, and therefore entitled to, a (1 + g) 
(b + d) units. Therefore s/he proposes to take away a (1+ g) – a (1 + g) 
(b + d) = a (1 + g) (1- b – d) units, leaving Smith with a – a (1 + g) (1 – b 
– d) = a (b + d – g + g b + g d) units. In fact, Smith should, according to 
luck egalitarianism, hold the a b units for which s/he is actually responsible. 
Thus the estimation errors have resulted in Smith retaining a (b + d – g + 
g b + g d) – a b = a (d – g + g b + g d) units too many (or being stripped 
of too many if this number is negative). So as a percentage of the units to 
which Smith is actually entitled under luck egalitarianism this is
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100 a (d + g b + g d – g) = 100 (g b + g d + d – g)
   a b  b
The first italicized formula shows the percentage divergence of applied 
outcome egalitarianism from its ideal under informational constraints. 
The second is the counterpart formula for luck egalitarianism. Positive 
outputs from either of the italicized formulae denote instances of indi-
viduals receiving more than they ought to under the principle in question, 
while negative outputs denote instances of individuals receiving less than 
they ought to under the principle in question. Outputs of zero denote 
instances of individuals receiving the appropriate share of U. Our analysis 
will focus on the magnitude of the errors in estimating appropriate shares. 
The main point of interest is the tendency of application of the two 
egalitarian principles to result in distributions that diverge from their 
ideals. Whether a divergence of a given size is in one direction or the 
other is irrelevant to the question of application accuracy.
Both formulae tell us what we know already – that sometimes luck 
egalitarianism is more accurate than outcome egalitarianism and some-
times it is less accurate. To get any idea of how often luck egalitarianism 
is more accurate and how often it is less accurate it is necessary to enter 
values into the formulae. The findings where one such set of values are 
entered will be reported below. There is nothing particularly significant 
about these values, other than that they do not obviously appear to be 
biased in a way that favours one or other of the egalitarian principles (for 
more on the methodology and the full results see Appendices A and B). 
This rudimentary model is just a way for us to start to explore these 
complex issues, but it is instructive nevertheless.
The values used represented a society exhibiting the following fea-
tures. One third of the population initially hold 5U, one third hold 10U, 
one third hold 15U. In addition, one third of the population is respon-
sible for 50% of their individual initial holdings, one third is responsible 
for 100% of their holding, and one third is responsible for 150% of their 
— 481 —
Ethical Perspectives 19 (2012) 3
cArl & roger KnIght – equAlIty And InformAtIon
holding (and therefore are, on a luck egalitarian scheme, entitled to 50% 
more than they hold). Finally, the Ministry of Distributive Justice may 
overestimate or underestimate the initial holding or responsibility of any 
individual by 10, 20, 30, 40 or 50%, or may estimate correctly in both 
cases. Any individual is equally likely to be subject to any of these 121 
combinations of holding and responsibility estimates.
Under these conditions, outcome egalitarianism has a mean diver-
gence from its ideal of 27%. This compares favourably with luck egali-
tarianism’s mean divergence from its ideal of 36%. But while this varia-
tion in application accuracy is important, it is hardly grounds for rejecting 
luck egalitarianism. It suggests that luck egalitarianism can be applied 
surprisingly accurately, given that it relies on potentially unreliable infor-
mation about two variables rather than outcome egalitarianism’s one. It 
is less accurate than outcome egalitarianism, but the space between the 
two is not insurmountable. Indeed, it is rather less than the doubled inac-
curacy that one might, intuitively, expect from reliance on a second source 
of potentially inaccurate information. There are very many individual 
cases in which luck egalitarianism is more accurate, and in reasonably 
realistic circumstances (for instance, those in which there is less variation 
in, or better information about, responsibility) it will even be more accu-
rate overall. The comparative performance of the two theories very much 
depends on the patterns of responsibility and accuracy of the information 
systems found in the society in question.
Iv. contInuIty And monotony
Outcome egalitarianism is monotonic as an improvement in holding 
information necessarily results in an improvement in accuracy. It is con-
tinuous as small information errors result in small outcome errors, while 
large information errors result in large outcome errors. This is explained 
by the linear relationship between |g| and outcome egalitarianism, as 
g is a factor of 100a g. Increasing the holding error by a factor of n 
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necessarily increases the application accuracy by that factor. The mono-
tonicity and continuity of outcome egalitarianism is illustrated by the 
strong correlation between the magnitude of the error in holding estima-
tion and the degree of inaccuracy shown in Figure 1 (see also Table 1 in 
Appendix B).
Luck egalitarianism is, as suspected, non-monotonic, for an improvement 
in one kind of information sometimes results in larger outcome errors, 
while a deterioration in one kind of information sometimes results in 
more accuracy. It is discontinuous, for small information errors some-
times result in large outcome errors, and large information errors some-
times result in small outcome errors. Indeed, as Figure 2 shows, even 
where the holding estimate is spot on, the degree of application inaccu-
racy may be large (here, as much as 50% divergence from the luck egali-
tarian ideal), and where it is estimated very inaccurately the degree of 
application inaccuracy may be small or non-existent (see also Tables 2-4 
in Appendix B).
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Note that the d term and the g term have different signs, which leads the 
two errors to offset each other in some cases, making luck egalitarianism 
more accurately applied than outcome egalitarianism. For example, for all 
values of |d| (assuming |d| ≤ b and d + b ≤ 2) there exists some equal 
or larger value of |g| (i.e. an equivalent or even less accurate estimate) 
which enables luck egalitarianism to be applied with perfect accuracy (i.e. 
0% error).
Proof 1: See Appendix C.
Luck egalitarianism is less accurately realized than outcome egalitarianism 
where information about responsibility is worse than information about 
initial holding (|d| > |g|). This is because large |d| makes |100 (g b + 
g d + d – g)| large, and therefore luck egalitarianism inaccurate, whereas 
outcome egalitarianism is entirely independent of d.
The opposite is true where the information about initial holdings is 
worse than the information about responsibility (|d| < |g|). This is 
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because, although large |g| always makes |100a g| large and therefore 
makes outcome egalitarianism less accurate, large |g| does not necessar-
ily increase |100 (g b + g d + d – g)|, as the –g term compensates for 
the gb term. Tables 2-4 all hold examples of less accurate holding infor-
mation (larger |g|) leading luck egalitarianism to be more accurately 
applied.
Luck egalitarianism tends to be less well applied than outcome egali-
tarianism where there are small errors in holding information, but copes 
better than outcome egalitarianism where there are large errors. This is 
explained by the linear relationship between outcome egalitarianism’s 
accuracy and the error in the holding estimate, and luck egalitarianism’s 
reliance on a further information source. As already noted, small |g| 
automatically makes |100ag| small, and therefore makes outcome egali-
tarianism accurate; likewise, large |g| automatically makes |100ag| large, 
and therefore makes outcome egalitarianism inaccurate. But as large |g| 
does not necessarily increase |100 (g b + g d + d – g)|, luck egalitarian-
ism’s accuracy often increases with the size of holding errors. Figure 3, 
which combines Figures 1 and 2, illustrates this point. In particular, the 
left side of the graph shows lines for outcome egalitarianism and luck 
egalitarianism heading in opposite directions. While outcome egalitarian-
ism here (predictably) decreases in application accuracy as holding esti-
mates worsen, increased holding underestimates result in increased applica-
tion accuracy for luck egalitarianism in two out of the three scenarios 
shown for it.
There is no cause for thinking that either the discontinuity or the non-
monotonocity can themselves count decisively against luck egalitarianism. 
What we are interested in is approximating an egalitarian ideal as closely 
as possible; how exactly an approximation is brought about, be it with or 
without continuity or monotonicity, is of at most secondary interest. An 
improvement in holding information will necessarily result in an improve-
ment in application accuracy under outcome egalitarianism, but equally, 
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a less accurate estimate will necessarily result in a decrease in accuracy. 
Sometimes luck egalitarianism’s more variable character will result in 
more accuracy, as when a large responsibility overestimate cancels out a 
large holding underestimate. Even when the overestimate or underesti-
mate are not of the same magnitude, the smaller one still diminishes the 
scale of the inaccuracy under luck egalitarianism, while outcome egali-
tarianism is just stuck with a big overestimate or underestimate.
This is, of course, a double-edged sword. Sometimes luck egalitarian-
ism’s use of two kinds of information means that one error compounds 
another. Let g and d1 both be underestimates, where b > |d1| ≈ |g| and 
g > -1, and define h1 to be the resultant error in applying luck egalitarian-
ism. Then replacing d1 with a larger responsibility underestimate d2 [where 
|d2| > |d1|] will always result in a larger error in applying luck egalitarian-
ism, e.g. |h 2| > |h 1|.
Proof 2: See Appendix C. 
This result also holds if g, d1 and d2 are all overestimates.
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Proof 3: See Appendix C.
The relative accuracy of the two forms of egalitarianism suggests that, in 
our simulated society, this latter phenomenon is a little more pervasive 
than the cancelling out effect. But information patterns in a particular 
society may be such that the cancelling out effect is more prominent. In 
that case, and if we otherwise have nothing to choose between luck egal-
itarianism and outcome egalitarianism, the discontinuity and non-mono-
tonicity is preferable, for it takes us closer to egalitarian justice. Alterna-
tively, the information patterns in the society in question might usually 
involve responsibility errors exacerbating holding errors, in which case 
outcome egalitarianism would be clearly superior to luck egalitarianism as 
regards application. In either case, continuity and monotonicity are really 
only relevant insofar as they influence application accuracy; in our main 
example, the far higher degrees of continuity and monotonicity under 
outcome egalitarianism translate into a small accuracy advantage.
v. lucK egAlItArIAnIsm by outcome egAlItArIAn meAns
Although the above model is designed to assess the direct practicality of 
two forms of egalitarianism, rather than the performance of different 
approaches to realizing luck egalitarianism, purely practical objections to 
luck egalitarianism can take little succour from our findings. We have seen 
that outcome egalitarian policies are not, on the available evidence, tre-
mendously more likely to realize outcome egalitarian results than luck 
egalitarian policies are to bring about luck egalitarian results. For outcome 
egalitarian policy to be better for luck egalitarianism than avowedly luck 
egalitarian policy, as one form of purely practical objection endorsed by 
Nicholas Barry (2006; 2008) and others suggests, one would expect 
greater dominance of the former over the latter when both are in their 
own backyard, so to speak. The evidence thus far suggests that over-
application of luck egalitarianism is not the all pervasive problem the 
purely-practical objector takes it to be. Indeed, ‘under-application’ of luck 
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egalitarianism – a failure to fully account for variations in responsibility 
– is equally prevalent in the results of our model.
These informal observations are supported by a simple extension of 
the model that allows us to see how well outcome egalitarianism could 
be expected to do as a rule of regulation for achieving luck egalitarian 
ends. The formula for the percentage divergence of outcome egalitarian-
ism from the luck egalitarianism ideal under informational constraints can 
be derived as follows. Smith again holds a units. The Department of 
Justice again assume Smith’s holding to be a (1 + g) units, where g is the 
error in estimating the size of the holding as a fraction of that holding. 
The outcome egalitarian minister in the Ministry of Justice considers 
Smith, like all members of society, to be entitled to e units. S/he there-
fore proposes to strip Smith of a (1 + g) – e units, leaving Smith with a 
– a (1 + g) + e = e – a g units. In fact, Smith should, according to luck 
egalitarianism, hold the a b units for which s/he is actually responsible, 
where b is the fraction of the holding for which Smith is responsible. 
Thus Smith has retained e – a g – a b units too many (or too few if this 
number is negative) compared to the luck egalitarianism ideal due to the 
application of outcome egalitarianism. So as a percentage of the units to 
which Smith is actually entitled under luck egalitarianism this is
100 (e – a g – a b)
     a b 
It will be recalled that luck egalitarianism’s mean divergence from its ideal, 
under the conditions described in section III, was 36%. Under the same 
conditions outcome egalitarianism has a divergence from the luck egalitar-
ian ideal of 83% (for full results see Tables 5 to 7 in Appendix B). This 
strongly suggests that, contrary to the purely practical objection, luck 
egalitarianism is much more accurately realized where the rule of regula-
tion is luck egalitarian than where the rule is outcome egalitarianism. 
Indeed, the gap between luck egalitarianism’s ability to realize its ideal 
and outcome egalitarianism’s ability to realize the luck egalitarian ideal 
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(47 percentage points) is far greater than the gap between luck egalitarian-
ism’s ability to achieve its ideal and outcome egalitarianism’s ability to 
achieve its ideal (9 percentage points). For prima facie outcome egalitarian 
policy to be a better route to luck egalitarianism than prima facie luck 
egalitarian policy, informational conditions would have to be vastly less 
favourable for the latter than the conditions explored here.
Figure 4 provides a graphical representation of some of the results. It is 
identical to Figure 3, except that the lines representing outcome egalitar-
ian attempts to realize its ideal are replaced by lines representing how 
close outcome egalitarian policy comes to realizing the luck egalitarian 
ideal (and consequently, the y axis has been rescaled). As will by now be 
familiar, luck egalitarian policy tends to fare worse where responsibility 
errors, d, are large. But at its most inaccurate (in this case, where the larg-
est responsibility error is combined with the largest positive holding error, 
g), luck egalitarian policy is only around half as inaccurate as outcome 
egalitarian policy is at its most inaccurate. This extreme inaccuracy can be 
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explained by the fact that, while outcome egalitarian policy is insulated 
from responsibility considerations where it is pursuing its own ideal (as 
in Figure 3), where it is used as a means of achieving luck egalitarianism 
its accuracy is influenced by the extent to which it tracks individuals’ 
actual responsibility, b. But of course, unlike luck egalitarian policy, it 
makes no attempt to do so, so it will much more often be wildly inac-
curate, as in the upper left quarter of Figure 4.
vI. conclusIon
We have seen, in general terms, how well luck egalitarianism negotiates 
various informational obstacles that may seem to be in the way of it being 
a feasible distributive theory. It should be reiterated that its actual perfor-
mance is subject to informational conditions. Where conditions have 
been specified this has been done in what seem to be the fairest ways 
possible. Luck egalitarianism and outcome egalitarianism have been com-
pared in circumstances where they face identical informational conditions. 
The informational inaccuracies presumed for the ‘headline’ mean diver-
gence figures of 36% for luck egalitarianism, 27% for outcome egalitari-
anism, and 83% for outcome egalitarianism when used as a method for 
realizing luck egalitarianism were equal for outcome information and 
responsibility information, and the ranges of the inaccuracies seemed as 
good as any.
The only obvious way of setting ‘better’ conditions than those of the 
crude but instructive model presented here is by entering into empirical 
territory. It is highly likely that real world results will differ from any of 
our simulations, but assuming that we make allowance for new methods 
of gathering responsibility information, it is hard to say whether they will 
benefit or disadvantage luck egalitarianism’s accuracy. If we drop that 
assumption, outcome egalitarianism is likely to be benefited, and luck 
egalitarianism disadvantaged, simply because real world governments do 
not routinely gather responsibility information in the way they gather 
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outcome information (via proxies for advantage such as income and 
wealth). The fact that governments are presently outcome-orientated 
would be rather flimsy grounds on which to reject responsibility sensitiv-
ity. In any case, when it comes to application accuracy, as much else, true 
generality is shown only by the formulae.
With the stipulated conditions, luck egalitarianism did not fare as well 
as outcome egalitarianism at realizing their respective ideals, but the dif-
ference was not great. Luck egalitarianism’s reference to responsibility 
information introduced a new source of error that often increased appli-
cation inaccuracy. But on other occasions errors in responsibility informa-
tion pulled in the opposite direction to errors in holding information, so 
that under luck egalitarianism responsibility errors cancelled out the 
effects of holding errors, while outcome egalitarianism was stuck with the 
unmitigated effects of the holding errors.
We must also remind ourselves that the arguments about practicality 
are only part of the story. For luck egalitarianism to be rejected solely or 
principally on the grounds of the inaccuracy of its application, its disadvan-
tage on this score would have to be quite overwhelming. A practical-fun-
damental objection of this sort requires luck egalitarianism to be outright 
unfeasible. The kind of small overall disadvantage we have seen it actually 
has may be seen to give it an advantage, for the presumption has tended 
to be that outcome egalitarianism is far superior in this regard. Contrary to 
such expectations, it appears that luck egalitarianism would actually outper-
form outcome egalitarianism under many viable social arrangements. Moral 
arguments in support of luck egalitarianism may be more widely entertained 
once it is clear that the theory is not utopian in the pejorative sense of 
describing “a form of collective life that humans, or most humans, could 
not lead and could not come to be able to lead through any feasible process 
of social and mental development” (Nagel 1991, 6).
We also found that luck egalitarianism appears to be a much better 
rule of regulation for achieving luck egalitarian outcomes than is outcome 
egalitarianism. In other words, on the available evidence, the purely 
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practical objection appears unsound. We must, of course, reiterate that 
the available evidence is limited, consisting in simulations rather than 
empirical data, as was the case when considering the practical-fundamen-
tal objection. But the results of the simulations are far more pronounced 
in this case, so we have much stronger evidence for the claim that luck 
egalitarianism is a better means to luck egalitarian ends than is outcome 
egalitarianism than we do for the claim that outcome egalitarianism can 
be more easily realized than luck egalitarianism.6 
AppendIx A: method
Tables relevant to the discussion of the accuracy, continuity, and mono-
tonicity of applying outcome egalitarianism and luck egalitarianism are 
presented in Appendix B. Table 1 was devised using the first of the for-
mulae presented in section III, while Tables 2-4 were devised using the 
second. Tables 5-7 were devised using the formula presented in section 
V. In all three cases the values used are those mentioned shortly after the 
presentation of the formulae in section III. Negative percentage diver-
gence figures (representing underestimates of entitlements) have been 
converted to positives for presentation in the tables and in Figures 1-4, 
since our concern is the absolute size of the errors in appropriate share 
estimates.
The figures mentioned already for mean divergence from luck and 
outcome egalitarian ideals (36%, 27%, and 83%) have been arrived at 
using the following simple method. For outcome egalitarianism, sum the 
percentage divergence for each informational scenario found in Table 1 
and divide this by 33 (the number of scenarios). For luck egalitarianism, 
sum the percentage divergence for each informational scenario described 
in Tables 2-4 and divide this by 363 (the number of scenarios). For out-
come egalitarianism as a luck egalitarian rule of regulation, sum the per-
centage divergence for each informational scenario described in Tables 
5-7 and divide this by 99 (the number of scenarios).
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Note that the 121 informational scenarios are fully represented in 
Tables 2-4 (each of which describes the treatment of those at one of the 
three levels of responsibility) but that these reduce to 33 scenarios for the 
purposes of Tables 1, 5, 6, and 7 as responsibility considerations are dis-
counted by outcome egalitarianism (even when it is being used as a means 
to luck egalitarian ends).
AppendIx b: tAbles
tAble 1. Percentage divergence of applied outcome egalitarianism from its ideal under 
various informational conditions with e held constant at 10
g =  
– 0.5
g =  
– 0.4 
g = 
– 0.3
g =  
– 0.2
g =  
– 0.1
g = 0 g =  
0.1
g =  
0.2
g =  
0.3
g =  
0.4
g =  
0.5
a = 5 25 20 15 10 5 0 5 10 15 20 25
a = 10 50 40 30 20 10 0 10 20 30 40 50
a = 15 75 60 45 30 15 0 15 30 45 60 75
tAble 2. Percentage divergence of applied luck egalitarianism from its ideal under 
various informational conditions with b held constant at 0.5
g =  
– 0.5
g =  
– 0.4
g =  
– 0.3
g =  
– 0.2
g =  
– 0.1
g = 0 g =  
0.1
g = 
 0.2
g =  
0.3
g =  
0.4
g =  
0.5
d =  
– 0.5
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
d =  
– 0.4
10 8 26 44 62 80 98 116 134 152 170
d =  
– 0.3
20 4 12 28 44 60 76 92 108 124 140
d =  
– 0.2
30 16 2 12 26 40 54 68 82 96 110
d =  
– 0.1
40 28 16 4 8 20 32 44 56 68 80
d = 0 50 40 30 20 10 0 10 20 30 40 50
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g =  
– 0.5
g =  
– 0.4
g =  
– 0.3
g =  
– 0.2
g =  
– 0.1
g = 0 g =  
0.1
g = 
 0.2
g =  
0.3
g =  
0.4
g =  
0.5
d =  
0.1
60 52 44 36 28 20 12 4 4 12 20
d =  
0.2
70 64 58 52 46 40 34 28 22 16 10
d =  
0.3
80 76 72 68 64 60 56 52 48 44 40
d =  
0.4
90 88 86 84 82 80 78 76 74 72 70
d =  
0.5
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
tAble 3. Percentage divergence of applied luck egalitarianism from its ideal under 
various informational conditions with b held constant at 1
g =  
– 0.5
g =  
– 0.4 
g =  
– 0.3
g =  
– 0.2
g =  
– 0.1
g = 0 g =  
0.1 
g =  
0.2
g =  
0.3
g =  
0.4
g = 
0.5
d =  
– 0.5
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75
d =  
– 0.4
20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 60
d =  
– 0.3
15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 39 42 45
d =  
– 0.2
10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
d =  
– 0.1
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
d = 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
d = 0.1 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
d = 0.2 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
d = 0.3 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 39 42 45
d = 0.4 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 60
d = 0.5 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75
— 494 —
 Ethical Perspectives 19 (2012) 3
ethIcAl perspectIves – september 2012
tAble 4. Percentage divergence of applied luck egalitarianism from its ideal under 
various informational conditions with b held constant at 1.5
g =  
– 0.5
g =  
– 0.4 
g =  
– 0.3
g =  
– 0.2
g =  
– 0.1
g = 0 g =  
0.1
g =  
0.2
g =  
0.3
g =  
0.4
g =  
0.5
d =  
– 0.5
33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3
d =  
– 0.4
30 29.3 28.7 28 27.3 26.7 26 25.3 24.7 24 23.3
d =  
– 0.3
26.7 25.3 24 22.7 21.3 20 18.7 17.3 16 14.7 13.3
d =  
– 0.2
23.3 21.3 19.3 17.3 15.3 13.3 11.3 9.3 7.3 5.3 3.3
d =  
– 0.1
20 17.3 14.7 12 9.3 6.7 4 1.3 1.3 4 6.7
d =  
0
16.7 13.3 10 6.7 3.3 0 3.3 6.7 10 13.3 16.7
d =  
0.1
13.3 9.3 5.3 1.3 2.7 6.7 10.7 14.7 18.7 22.7 26.7
d =  
0.2
10 5.3 0.7 4 8.7 13.3 18 22.7 27.3 32 36.7
d =  
0.3
6.7 1.3 4 9.3 14.7 20 25.3 30.7 36 41.3 46.7
d =  
0.4
3.3 2.7 8.7 14.7 20.7 26.7 32.7 38.7 44.7 50.7 56.7
d =  
0.5
0 6.7 13.3 20 26.7 33.3 40 46.7 53.3 60 66.7
tAble 5. Percentage divergence of applied outcome egalitarianism from the luck 
egalitarian ideal under various informational conditions with e held constant at 10 and 
b held constant at 0.5 
g =   
– 0.5
g =   
– 0.4 
g =   
– 0.3
g =  
– 0.2
g =   
– 0.1
g = 0 g = 
0.1
g = 
0.2
g = 
0.3
g = 
0.4
g = 
0.5
a =  
5
400 380 360 340 320 300 280 260 240 220 200
a =  
10
200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0
a =  
15
133.3 113.3 93.3 73.3 53.3 33.3 13.3 6.7 26.7 46.7 66.7
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TAble 6. Percentage divergence of applied outcome egalitarianism from the luck 
egalitarian ideal under various informational conditions with e held constant at 10 and 
b held constant at 1.0 
g =  
– 0.5
g =  
– 0.4 
g =  
– 0.3
g =  
– 0.2
g =  
– 0.1
g = 0 g =  
0.1
g =  
0.2
g =  
0.3
g =  
0.4
g =  
0.5
a = 5 150 140 130 120 110 100 90 80 70 60 50
a = 10 50 40 30 20 10 0 10 20 30 40 50
a = 15 16.7 6.7 3.3 13.3 23.3 33.3 43.3 53.3 63.3 73.3 83.3
tAble 7. Percentage divergence of applied outcome egalitarianism from the luck 
egalitarian ideal under various informational conditions with e held constant at 10 and 
b held constant at 1.5
g =  
– 0.5
g =  
– 0.4 
g =  
– 0.3
g =  
– 0.2
g =  
– 0.1
g = 0 g =  
0.1
g =  
0.2
g =  
0.3
g =  
0.4
g =  
0.5
a = 5 66.7 60 53.3 46.7 40 33.3 26.7 20 13.3 6.7 0
a = 10 0 6.7 13.3 20 26.7 33.3 40 46.7 53.3 60 66.7
a = 15 22.2 28.9 35.6 42.2 48.9 55.6 62.2 68.9 75.6 82.2 88.9
AppendIx c: proofs
proof 1: If luck egalitarianism can be applied without any errors, then
0 =
100 (g b + g d + d – g)
b
therefore it follows that
0 = g b + g d + d – g
g – g b – g d = d
then if b + d = 1 it follows that d = 0 so the theorem holds.
If b + d ≠ 1 it follows that
g (1- b – d) = d
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g =  d _
1- b – d
=  d _
1- (b + d)
By the first half of the assumption, |d| ≤ b so it follows that
-d ≤ b
0 ≤ b + d
Using this, and the second half of the assumption, 0 ≤ b + d ≤ 2 and so it 
follows that
-2 ≤ – (b + d) ≤ 0
-1 ≤ 1 – (b + d) ≤ 1
-1 ≤
d
g
≤ 1
d < |g|
Hence the stated result.
proof 2: Assume that d2 < d1 <  g < 0. Define h1 to be the resultant error 
in applying luck egalitarianism. So
h 1 =
100 (g b + g d1 + d1 – g)
b
Note that h 1 < 0 since b is positive, gb + gd1 < 0 and d1 – g ≤ 0 from the 
stated assumptions.
Since d2 < d1, there exists some j > 0 such that d2 = d1 – j. It follows that
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h 2 = 100 (g b + g d2 + d2 – g)
b
h 2 = 100 (g b + g d1 - g j + d1 - j – g)
B
h 2 = h 1 - j (g + 1)
b
So since j and (g + 1) are both positive, |h 2| > |h 1|.
proof 3: Assume that 0 < g < d1 < d2. Define h1 to be the resultant error 
in applying luck egalitarianism. So 
h 1 = 100 (g b + g d1 + d1 – g)
b
Note that h 1 > 0 since b, gb, gd1 > 0 and d1 – g ≈ 0 from the stated 
assumptions.
Since d2 > d1, there exists some j > 0 such that d2 + d1 = j. It follows that
h 2 = 100 (g b + g d2 + d2 – g)
b
h 2 = 100 (g b + g d1 + g j + d1 + j – g)
b
h 2 = h 1 + j (g + 1)
b
So since j and (g + 1) are both positive, h 2 > h 1.
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notes
1. Fleurbaey (1995); Wolff (1998); Anderson (1999); Hurley (2003); Scheffler (2003); Schef-
fler (2005). For responses, see Arneson (2000a; 2000b); Knight (2009). 
2. For general characterization of distributive mechanisms that distinguish relevant and 
irrelevant characteristics, see Bossert (1995); Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996). For an explicitly luck 
egalitarian model, see Roemer (1993; 1998). 
3. There is a construal of the objection other than those mentioned in the text. It places 
the emphasis on the specific contention that continual improvement in the quality of the information 
about each individual is required in order for the theory in question to be fair or useful in practice. 
But there is no reason to believe that a theory and/or its application is mistaken if, at different 
temporal points, they make, on the evidence available at each time, recommendations that point 
in different directions as regards persons’ transfer statuses. Such a theory simply recognizes that 
the important thing so far as distributive justice is concerned is not to pretend that everything is 
and always has been perfect, but rather to do the very best we can, even when this involves 
U-turns. 
4. On the non-monotonic nature of the relationship between the degree of responsibility 
assigned to people and the amount of luck egalitarian redistribution, see Cappelen and Tungodden 
(2006).  
5. The objection may reach beyond attempts to apply luck egalitarianism that rely on fine-
grained personal responsibility information. Even Roemer’s scheme, which approximates personal 
responsibility from information about individuals’ ‘types’ (e.g. black male steelworker), has been 
criticized as impracticable on account of the large number of types involved (Solow 1995; see also 
Roemer 1995). 
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